Moral Warfare in Counterinsurgency Operations

The purpose behind this monograph was to explore the moral level of war in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the larger framework of counterinsurgency operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom is a war fought in the moral realm and the resulting operational environment poses complex ethical dilemmas for the U.S. Army. This monograph argues that resistance to U.S. endeavors in Iraq is due to losses in the moral realm for the compliance and support of the Iraqi people which is critical in defeating any insurgency. The method of analysis employed is qualitative analysis of ethics, morality and counterinsurgency. Analysis of the OIF operational environment and principles of Moral Warfare established premises that formed my conclusion. Deductive reasoning led me to conclude that the Army needs to embark on an urgent reassessment to remedy current ethical trends and regain our moral authority in Iraqi. This monograph draws heavily from cotemporary literature on morality, Just War Theory, and COIN ethics in order to define Moral Warfare. The center of gravity of COIN operations is accepted as the support of the population. I attempt to show that the conduct of U.S. forces directly impacts the population's sense of security and their level of support. In the conduct of research the notion of moral asymmetry emerged. Insurgents are not governed by Western morality. Differences in morality clearly affect insurgent tactics and objectives. Morally asymmetric operations exploit our inability to combat the effects of terror tactics. U.S. forces are constrained by the law of war as well as Western values in combating violent insurgencies. The conclusion is not intended to criticize the professionalism of the U.S. military but to highlight the importance of ethics in obtaining the support of the Iraqi people and ultimately improve the perception of the U.S. military. The ethical conduct of the military ultimately generates legitimacy and political capital necessary for the next